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COMMENTS




In case after case, courts acting upon the custody of a child have
stated the basis upon which they must decide: "The paramount consider-
ation in cases of this nature is at all times the best interests and welfare of
the child, which includes its physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual
well-being, and all other considerations are subordinate." ' The difficul-
ties of establishing standards to determine "best interests," or a satisfac-
tory level of "moral and spiritual well-being," have led the courts to
avoid such questions by focusing almost exclusively upon the behavior of
the parents involved in custody litigation. In the name of a child's "best
interests" the courts have surveyed every aspect of parents' lives, invad-
ing their constitutional rights to privacy and to the exercise of free speech,
religion, association and travel.
The implicit assumption that a child's welfare is simply a function of
parental behavior results in injustice to both parent and child. Since
identifying "good" parental behavior is at best a subjective process, a
parent is victim to a particular judge's values and beliefs. In addition, by
focusing solely upon parental behavior, courts have ignored any needs of
the child not totally dependent upon the behavior of the parents, particu-
larly the need for stability and continuity of relationships.
This comment explores the extent to which problems in applying the
"best interests" doctrine have led to an abuse of judicial discretion and a
resultant violation of parents' constitutional rights. Alternatives to the
present approach will be proposed with the hope that they may be adopted
by the courts to protect both the child's best interests, insofar as they can
be determined, and the parents' constitutional rights. Since it is important
to examine the authority upon which a court acts in order to determine the
1. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 444, 292 A.2d
380, 383 (1972).
proper boundaries of its inquiry, the evolution of the state's right to
decide child custody will be briefly considered.
II. Source and Extent of Judicial Discretion
Under the theory of parenspatriae2 the state has assumed the role of
protector of the children within its borders and has exercised its role by
giving judges wide discretion in cases deciding the interests of children:
The chancellor, in exercising his jurisdiction . . . does not
proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether father or
mother, has a cause of action against the other or in-deed against
anyone. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the
interest of the child. He is to put himself in the position of a
wise, affectionate, and careful parent. . . and make provision
for the child accordingly. . . . [Equity's] concern is for the
child.
3
Certainly no one can find fault with a benevolent court looking after
helpless children within its jurisdiction. It is, rather, the question of just
how far the eyes of this "wise, affectionate and careful parent" may peer
into the family, and by what standards he may judge what he sees, that
has caused concern.
4
In non-custody contexts, the United States Supreme Court has lim-
ited the parens patriae doctrine by prohibiting judicial interference with
specific aspects of the parent-child relationship. 5 The Court has not,
2. Pennsylvania first recognized the doctrine in Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa.
1839), in which the court defended the state's right to place delinquent children in a house of
refuge:
[M]ay not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy
of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or common guardian of the communi-
ty? . . . That parents are ordinarily intrusted with it is because it can seldom be
put into better hands; but where they are incompetent or currupt, what is there to
prevent the public from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they obviously are, at
its sufference? The right of parental control is a natural, but not an unalienable
one. It is not excepted by the declaration of rights out of the subjects of ordinary
legislation; and it consequently remains subject to the ordinary legislative power
which, if wantonly or inconveniently used, would soon be constitutionally re-
stricted, but the competency of which, as the government is constituted, cannot
be doubted.
4 Whart. at 11 (emphasis added).
3. Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudication of Child Custody Questions, 8 U.
RIcH. L. REV- 151, 161-62 (1974), quoting Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, -, 148 N.E. 624,
626 (1925).
4. [T]he judge, by virtue of parens patriae, has the freedom and perhaps the
responsibility to use his own subjective views . . . . He evaluates the evidence;
he decides its weight. It is his subjective response that is important. Judges, again
by virtue of parens patriae, are supposed to be endowed with unique insight into
the best interests of the child.
S. KATZ. WHEN PARENTS FAIL 59 (1971). "The parens patriae doctrine and its concomitant
powers has been the traditional vehicle through which the state has demanded that child-
rearing practice conform to contemporary community standards." Levin, Caveat Parens: A
Demystification of the Child Protection System, 35 U. PTrr. L. REV. 1 (1973).
5. In a series of cases, the Court has held that parents have the right to control the
education of their children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); the right to send their
children to private schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)("It is not
seriously debatable that the parental right to guide one's child intellectually and religiously is
a most substantial part of the liberty and freedom of the parent." Id. at 518. "The child is
not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
however, dealt directly with the problem of reconciling the "best inter-
ests" doctrine with the constitutional rights of parents in custody pro-
ceedings. Nor have the courts adequately delineated the limits of the
parens patriae doctrine in order to restrain unbridled judicial discretion.
The "best interests" doctrine may itself have been intended to limit
discretion by directing the courts deciding custody cases to certain readily
identifiable presumptions.6 Nevertheless, even a cursory look at such
cases will show that the doctrine has been used not as a guide to arrive at a
decision, but rather as a phrase ready-made to justify the court's delving
into virtually any area of the parents' lives, and to support any conclusion
it finally draws.
7
Judicial discretion is also fostered by state statutes that confer juris-
diction of child custody issues upon the courts. Pennsylvania has three
custody statutes, giving judges the power to decide custody disputes
between parents, 8 to remove a child from parental custody if the child is
adjudged delinquent9 or deprived, t0 and to permanently terminate paren-
tal rights and free the child for adoption against a parent's wishes upon
failure or inability of the parent to properly care for the child. t
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Id. at 535); and the right to be exempt from compulsory education statutes if such statutes
interfere with the child's religious education, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of
the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children. The history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern
for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.
Id. at 232.
6. Generally, it has been held that compelling reasons must appear before a natural
parent will be deprived of custody, Auman v. Eash, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 242, 323 A.2d 94
(1974); that parental rights are only forfeited by factors which substantially affect the child's
welfare, Auman v. Eash, supra; that a child of tender years should be placed with its
mother, Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreishcher, 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243 (1973); and
that brothers and sisters should not be separated, Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v.
Johnson, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 262, 171 A.2d 627 (1961). The court has also considered the
parent's religion, Commonwealth ex rel. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 69 Montg. 292 (Pa. C.P.
1953); financial abilities, Commonwealth ex rel. Gardner v. Eastman, 172 Pa. Super. Ct.
496, 94 A.2d 175 (1953); and the preference of an intelligent child, Snellgrose Adoption
Case, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968); but such factors are not controlling.
7. See Bradbrook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the
Future Development of the Laws Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child Custody
Disputes, 1I J. FAM L. 557 (1971).
[Olne aspect of the child custody laws that has been left completely untouched
both by statute and common law [is] the exercise of judicial discretion. Whereas a
number of guidelines have evolved from common law, these are by no means
binding on judges.
Id. at 558.
8. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon 1965).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. II, § 50-322 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1H, § 50-321 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
Deprived child means a child who: (i) is without proper parental care or
control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control
necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals ....
Id. § 50-102(4).
I1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77):
Parental rights may be terminated if
(i) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 6 months either has
Judicial discretion so permeates these statutes that it is doubtful
whether they set any standards at all. A child is to have "proper" 12 or
"essential" 13 parental care, and "wholesome mental and physical
development." 14
[TIhese standards for intervention are subjective. From the
legislative perspective, they are designed to give a local judge,
who is close to the family situation and knowledgeable about
the community, discretion in interpretation and application.
The effect is to make these standards subject to a judge's
personal biases about sex, religion, and race, [and] his own
attitudes toward childrearing practices . . . .
The judge becomes the spokesman for community values. This tendency
is especially apparent in child neglect laws similar to Pennsylvania's
"deprived child" provision of the Juvenile Act. These statutes "incorpo-
rate a community's view of parenthood. Essentially, they are pronounce-
ments of unacceptable childrearing practices."'
6
Determination of legal neglect is not . . . a question of medical
or even psychological judgment, but is essentially a social poli-
cy issue. Primarily, neglect denotes conduct in conflict with the
childrearing standards of the dominant culture, and determina-
tion of neglect is based on social as well as legal judgment.' 7
Thus, through legislative action and the doctrine of parens patriae,
judges have been vested with the power to decide who is to have custody
of a child-even to terminate parents' rights in their own child-but they
have been given no workable guidelines except those of their own con-
sciences, shaped by the values of the culture in which they themselves were
raised. While many judges are careful in their exercise of discretion and
sensitive to the rights of parents, the potential for abuse is staggering. The
constitutional checks on judges remain the subject to broad interpretation
18
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties; or
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control, or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied
by the parent ....
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(4)(Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311(a)(Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101(b)(l)(Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
15. KATZ, supra note 4, at 59.
16. Id. at 57.
Public intrusion into the parent-child relationship occurs in response to child
neglect. Broadly speaking, child neglect occurs when the expectations of parent-
hood that are dominant in our culture are not met. From a legal perspective, child
neglect connotes a parent's conduct. . . that results in a failure to provide for the
child's needs as defined by the preferred values of the community.
Id. at 22.
17. Katz, Howe, McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 2 (1975).
18. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393 (1970).
[T]he venerable common law doctrine of parens patriae. . . declares the state to
be the ultimate guardian of every child. Under this doctrine, with its great
emphasis on the correlation of the welfare of the child with the welfare of the
state, the state has not only the right, but the duty to establish standards for a
child's care. The only constitutional check on this responsibility is that the
and, in fact, their power is rarely challenged.' 9
III. Abuse of Judicial Discretion: Violation of the Parents' Rights
Given this lack of concrete common-law and statutory standards to
guide the court, it is not surprising that every legal presumption20 is
riddled with exceptions, or that the scope of judicial inquiry is virtually
limitless. Indeed, cases in this area must be analyzed, initially, using a
two-step process: first, what presumptions did the court articulate within
its opinion and, second, for what reasons did the court decide to apply or
reject them. It becomes apparent that the presumptions are no more than a
convenient springboard, to be used or disregarded by the court at its
whim. Even when a decision ostensibly rests upon a presumption, a close
reading will usually show an independent basis for the holding. This
independent basis, whether a presumption was applied or rejected, gener-
ally centers about the court's analysis of the parent(s) in areas that would
otherwise be constitutionally protected. The following discussion deals
with areas in which the courts have repeatedly violated parents' constitu-
tional rights.
A. Religion
It is undisputed that the Constitution guarantees to every citizen
freedom of religion, and that courts may not show preference for one
religion over another.2" These fundamental rules, however, are bent and
strained under the weight of the best interests doctrine. The courts have
bisected the right to freedom of religion in such a way as to justify
infringement in this area: "Simply stated, the right to religious beliefs is
absolute, but conduct in pursuance thereof is not wholly immune from
government restraint.' '22
The most common case of intervention arises when parents threaten
the life of a child by refusing medical help for religious reasons.
23
Surprisingly, judicial restraint has been most evident in this area, and the
courts have been reluctant to act unless the child's life is in immediate
danger.24 When custody between parents is involved, however, judicial
restraint has often been disregarded. The courts will consider a parent's
religious beliefs, or lack of them, with impunity. In the medical help
cases, the controversy necessarily centers around the health of the child,
as it is that issue that brings the matter to the attention of the court. In
custody cases it is the "best interests" of the child that are at issue; there
standards so established must bear a reasonable relationship to the community's
health, safety or welfare.
Id. at 396.
19. See Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26
STAN. L. REv. 1383 (1974).
20. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
21. Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1410 (1959).
22. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 661 (1976).
23. Green Appeal, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
24. Id.
need be no showing that the life or health of a child is seriously en-
dangered before the court can probe the parents' religious beliefs.
Commonwealth ex rel. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann25 illustrates a
court's concern with a child's health in determining custody on the
grounds of religion. The court considered evidence disclosing that
the mother [a Jehovah's Witness] does not believe in blood
transfusions and under no circumstances would she permit
Barbara to have one; that the mother does not believe in ob-
serving or celebrating holidays-Christmas is just another day
to her; that the mother believes in obeying the civil law so long
as in her opinion it conforms with God's law, but if in her
opinion there is a conflict between the two, she would not obey
the civil law.
26
The court went on to recognize that the mother "has a right to entertain
her religious beliefs and to practice her religion and it is not our province
to discuss that phase of the case." 27 The court had, of course, just
completed discussing that phase of the case. It went on to articulate an
"acceptable" basis for the decision: the finding that the health of the
child was endangered because she "witnessed" with her mother and
attended meetings with her at night. Despite testimony that the child was
healthy, the court felt that she would be better off playing than accom-
panying her mother. This approach should be compared with the restraint
that the court would have exercised before interfering with the mother's
exercise of her religion if custody were not at issue, e.g., if the child's
father were dead or was also a Jehovah's Witness. The court's own
language reveals its preoccupation with the mother's religion and makes
it clear that it was upon the exercise of the mother's religion that the case
was decided, under the protective shield of "best interests":
If this mother wishes to inculcate in the mind of her child
doctrines and rules of conduct at variance with those of the vast
majority of children with whom she will associate in life, we
presume that is her right, but when she carries her activities to
the point where in our opinion the health and wellbeing of her
child are injured, then the court should step in to protect what
we consider the best interests and permanent welfare of the
child .28
Custody of the child was awarded to her Lutheran father, the court having
found compelling reasons to ignore the tender years doctrine.
29
In addition to comparing the merits of competing religions, courts
have uniformly preferred the religious home over the non-religious one.
Indeed, concern for the child's "spiritual well-being" is part of the "best
interests" litany, 30 thus opening the parents' religious beliefs to scrutiny.
25. 69 Montg. 292 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
26. Id. at 294.
27. id.
28. Id. at 295.
29. Accord, Commonwealth ex -el. Derr v. Derr, 148 Pa. Super. Ct. 511, 25 A.2d 769
(1942).
30. See note I and accompanying text supra.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Bordlemay v. Bordlemay3 1 the court found that
"[o]ne final consideration worthy of note is the husband's attention to the
child's spiritual training. He attends church regularly and takes the child
to Sunday School. On the other hand, the wife does not attend church." 32
Custody was awarded to the church-going parent.
Language such as that in Kaufmann and Bordlemay makes clear the
courts' ability to consider a parent's religion and make a custody determi-
nation upon that basis even though the parent's exercise of his religion, or
lack of religion, would be constitutionally protected in any other context.
Such consideration by the court is a flagrant abuse of the courts' power,
and a clear infringement of parents' rights.
B. Freedom of Association and Right to Privacy
Infringement of free association and privacy are also evident in child
custody cases. These rights are closely tied since the "associations" the
court most frequently looks to in determining parental fitness are sexual
relationships outside of marriage. Notwithstanding recent Supreme Court
decisions recognizing an individual's right to privacy,3 3 domestic courts
are preoccupied with "wholesome surroundings" and "moral lapses."
1. Heterosexual Relationships.-Common wealth ex rel. Tavoletti
v. Tavoletti34 identified factors to be considered in evaluating the sexual
relationships of those vying for custody. It recognized that a mother can
be denied custody because of "conduct which is unchaste or improper."
While the court did not feel that "a temporary lapse from moral stand-
ards" was controlling, it did declare that "persistent and flagrant . . .
[misconduct] is impossible to disregard . in considering what is best
for the child." It formulated the crucial question as being "whether such
misconduct affects the welfare of the child." 35 In the Tavoletti case the
court found that it had. While the trial court found that the mother was fit
and would normally be entitled to custody of her children, it granted her
only partial custody because of her "conduct with [a] particular married
man." ' 36 The court's language in limiting the mother's custody under-
scores the extent to which the court will overreach its authority in the
name of "best interests":
Once her behavior conforms with proper standards prescribed
by society and by law of this Commonwealth, her right to these
children should be re-examined. . . .On the other hand, if she
31. 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 46 (C.P. Leb.), aff'd, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 193 A.2d 845
(1963)(per curiam).
32. 31 Pa. D. & C.2d at 50.
33. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (insulating personal activities of
consenting adults).
34. 203 Pa. Super. Ct. 4, 198 A.2d 427 (1964).
35. Id. at 6, 198 A.2d at 428-29 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 7, 198 A.2d at 429.
continues to flaunt acceptable codes, then even the question of
her partial custody two days a week should be subject to a
further appraisal.3
Apparently, the court was less interested in the best interests of the child
than in using the child to punish the mother for "unacceptable" behavior.
The court acted as a moral guardian, using "society's standards," as it
interpreted them, to decide who is fit to have custody.
The result reached in Tavoletti, with its frightening implications of
judicial control over the life of a divorced parent, has often been repeated
in Pennsylvania cases. In Commonwealth ex rel. Doe v. Doe,38 a mother
pregnant with an illegitimate child was denied custody of her children
because the court did not approve of legitimate children being raised with
an illegitimate child. In fact, the court suggested that if the newborn were
to be placed for adoption the result might be different, for then "[t]he
result of the mother's moral lapse [would not] be constantly present.",
39
Another example of judicial sanctions against immoral conduct is
Commonwealth ex rel. Bordlemay v. Bordlemay,4° in which custody of
children was denied their mother because of a non-marital involvement.
4 1
The same result was reached in Snellgrose Adoption Case,42 a decision
all the more remarkable since it was a custody dispute between a mother
and a couple who had temporarily cared for the child. The court conceded
that there was no clear evidence of any present illicit relationship of the
widowed mother, but it listed instances of the mother's past misconduct43
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. 13 Cumb. 9 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
39. Id. at 10. The court expains,
Were it not for the fact of her pregnancy and the circumstances under which
it occurred, we would unhestitatingly award the children to the mother on the
basis that the interests of these two children of tender age would be best served by
leaving them with their mother . . . .This is not a case where a parent has been
guilty of a moral lapse and then straightened out . ... In this case, the mother
will this fall give birth to an illegitimate child, the mother not having remarried
.. .She said that she will not place the newborn child for adoption but will raise
the child with her two legitimate children . . . .The result of the mother's moral
lapse will be constantly present.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
40. 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 46 (C.P. Leb.), aff'd, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 193 A.2d 845
(1963)(per curiam).
41. [W]e opine that this mother has shown a serious emotional instability in that
she put her professed love for a married man, not her husband, ahead of her
affection for this child. While she continues in this disposition toward this man,
she should not be this child's legal custodian, for she might again be inclined to
relegate the child's welfare to a secondary position ....
31 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 51.
42. 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968).
43. Mrs. Snellgrose's past and present conduct leaves much to be desired in a
mother who is to provide the proper training for a teenage girl. In 1949, at the age
of 19 years and unmarried, she bore the child of a married man in Germany; six
years later, as a result of an illicit relationship with an American serviceman, she
bore Thomi; and presently, she appears to be engaged in a questionable relation-
ship with . ..a married man. Even though there is no clear evidence of illicit
relations between [them], their conduct is such as to deprive a home where a
young girl is being raised [of] a healthy moral atmosphere.
Id. at 163-64, 247 A.2d at 599. The court goes on to say that such conduct "is highly
improper . .. [and] would have a profound and adverse effect on her [the daughter's]
concept of moral values .. ." Id. at 164, 247 A.2d at 600.
and denied her custody on that basis. In Commonwealth ex rel. Likovich
v. Likovich4 a mother lost custody of her children, aged nine, six, and
four, to their father's parents, who had not even appeared before the
court. The case was decided on the basis of the mother's "unchaste or
• . . improper conduct," 4 5 with a minimal discussion of her fitness as a
mother, or any effect her conduct had on her children.
Another example of the courts' use of children as a means of
regulating a parent's private life is Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v.
Holland-Moritz.46 The superior court "hesitate[d] to characterize the
petitioner as an unfit mother and to conclude that she should not have her
children for that reason," 4 7 but denied custody anyway. The mother was
an architect who had admitted living with a fellow graduate student at
Yale while her children were living with her parents. The court denied her
custody until she could establish "an environment where their welfare
will be promoted . . . to the satisfaction of the Court." 48 The supreme
court affirmed, but remanded with orders to re-evaluate the situation
because of information that Mrs. Holschuh was then living alone. 49 In a
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Jones reluctantly supported the decision
because the "record demonstrate[d] to [his] satisfaction that [the mother]
ha[d] little or no regard for conventional standards, whether moral or
social. "50
Thus, in spite of professed respect for a natural parent's right to raise
her children absent compelling reasons dictating otherwise, judicial dis-
cretion has gone so unchecked that a mother may be denied custody
because of her disregard for "conventional standards." Two Justices
dissented in Holschuh, protesting that although the trial court had found
the mother fit, intelligent, and interested in the best welfare of her sons,
"this woman must suffer an additional hearing because-as a college
student living alone and apart from her children-her life style does not
pass the moral muster of the men making up the majority."'"
The exact situations under which "unchaste" conduct will result in
forfeiture of custody rights remain unclear. In fact, the courts grant
custody in many cases in which it would appear that custody would be
denied under the preceding cases. For example, in Commonwealth ex rel.
Staunton v. Austin,52 the court transferred custody of a four-year-old
child who was well-adjusted in a custodial home back to her mother, who
had a history of mental illness and was living with the child's father out of
44. 220 Pa. Super Ct. 202, 287 A.2d 156 (1971).
45. Id. at 205, 287 A.2d at 158.
46. 448 Pa. 437, 292 A.2d 380 (1972).
47. 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 402, 404, 281 A.2d 729, 730 (1971).
48. Id.
49. 448 Pa. 437, 292 A.2d 380 (1972).
50. Id. at 448, 292 A.2d at 385.
51. Id. at 450-51, 292 A.2d at 386-87 (emphasis in original) (Manderino J., dissenting).
52. 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 187, 223 A.2d 892 (1966).
wedlock. 53 And, in Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers,54 a white
mother living with her black paramour whom she planned to marry, was
allowed to retain custody of her children. The natural father admitted that
she was a good mother and objected only to the interracial relationship.
55
No effort is made by the courts to reconcile conflicting decisions or
justify differing outcomes. But all the cases at least purport to recognize
that "it is the effect of the nonmarital relationship ... itself which is
crucial to a custody decision. "56 However, they also consistently note
that "a parent's nonmarital relationships must be given close scrutiny in
determining custody matters. The prevailing issue must remain the best
interests of the child, and a nonmarital relationship is . . .one of the
circumstances which the court must consider before reaching its deci-
sion." 57 Either way, "best interests" can be used to justify the court's
"close scrutiny," and to support virtually any decision reached.
2. Homosexual Relationships. -The homosexuality of a parent
may be dealt with by the courts in a number of ways: homosexuals may
be declared unfit per se, homosexuality may be considered a relevant
factor in determining custody, or homosexuality in itself may be consi-
dered irrelevant to a custody decision.
58
The parent's constitutional right to privacy is particularly crucial
here, for investigation of a parent's sexual life to determine homosexu-
ality "flagrantly abuses [the] constitutionally protected right to
privacy."
59
As with heterosexual relationships, the court purports to invade the
parent's private life only after it has determined that it is necessary for the
best interests of the child. 6° The rights of homosexual parents are particu-
53. The mother and father had five children together, though, and the court recog-
nized the existence of a de facto family. The mother also testified that she would marry the
father when possible. These factors lessened the importance attached to the mother's
"unchaste" conduct.
54. -Pa.-, 360 A.2d 587 (1976).
55. The decision in this case may have been affected by the sensitivity of the racial
issue. The court had previously held, in Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa.
352, 299 A.2d 243 (1973), that a subsequent interracial marriage was not sufficient reason to
deny a mother custody. Here, too, there was an intent to marry and the mother was
otherwise fit.
For a discussion of race as a factor in custody awards, see Annot. 57 A.L.R.2d 678
(1958).
56. -Pa.-,-, 360 A.2d 587, 590 (1976) (emphasis added).
57. Id. at-, 360 A.2d at 589.
58. See Note, The Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A
Constitutional Challenge that Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 799, 816
(1975).
59. Id. at 838.
60. Of course the state does have a compelling interest in a child's welfare.
Therefore if a nexus can be established between a mother's Lesbianism and
detriment to her child, the state may abridge her constitutionally protected right to
privacy. However, because such a nexus has never been found, a government
assertion of a subordinating interest in transgressing a Lesbian mother's right to
privacy is at best tenuous.
Id. at 840.
larly vulnerable, however, since the court may focus not only on their
sexual relationships, as with heterosexual parents, but on their sexual
orientation itself. A recent New Jersey decision recognized the improprie-
ty of this approach:
The parental rights of a homosexual, like those of a
heterosexual, are constitutionally protected. Fundamental
rights of parents may not be denied, limited or restricted on the
basis of sexual orientation, per se. The right of a parent, includ-
eng a homosexual parent, to the companionship and care of his
or her child, insofar as it is for the best interest of the child, is a
fundamental right protected by the First, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments .... 61
The resolution of questions regarding a parent's sexual orientation will
continue to test the court's balancing of "best interests" and a parent's
right to privacy.
3. Lifestyle. -Problems similar to those relating to sexual be-
havior arise with inquiries into a parent's lifestyle. The most celebrated
case in which a court blatantly considered lifestyle in awarding custody is
Painter v. Bannister, 62 in which the Iowa Supreme Court was faced with
the question of who should have custody of seven-year-old Mark Painter.
Mark's father had sent him to live with his wife's parents after her death.
He was now remarried and anxious to resume custody, but the boy's
grandparents would not relinquish the child. The court began by paying
its nominal respect for the individuality of each family: "It is not our
prerogative to determine custody upon our choice of one of two ways of
life within normal and proper limits and we will not do so." 63 Then the
best interests doctrine was invoked to knock down the wall of privacy the
court had just recognized:
However, the philosophies [of the two families] are important
as they relate to Mark and his particular needs.
The Bannister home provides Mark with a stable, depend-
able, conventional, middle-class, middlewest background and
an opportunity for a college education and profession, if he
desires it. It provides a solid foundation and secure atmos-
phere. In the Painter home, Mark would have more freedom of
conduct and thought with an opportunity to develop his indi-
vidual talents. It would be more exciting and challenging in
many respects, but romantic, impractical and unstable.
In a broad assault on Mr. Painter, the court noted that he was raised
in a foster home, that he had an unstable work record, that he needed help
61. In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super, 486, 489, 324 A.2d 90, 92 (Ch. Div. 1974), affd,
142 N.J. Super. 499, 362 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1976). Custody had previously been granted to
the mother, and she brought the action to limit the father's visitation rights. Because of the
presence of his male lover at his apartment, and his outspoken support of a homosexual
liberation movement, the court agreed to limit his visitation rights to daylight hours. The
court's mention of the father's support of "gay rights" raises a question not only of privacy,
but of free speech.
62. 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
63. Id. at-, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
64. Id.
with financial bookkeeping, that he was an agnostic or atheist who had
read and been influenced by Zen Buddhism, that he was a political liberal
who got in trouble at one of his jobs for supporting ACLU activities, and
finally that he had conducted both a private and public funeral for his
wife, and wore a sport shirt and sweater to the public one.
65
These matters are not related as a criticism of Mr. Painter's
conduct, way of life or sense of values. An individual is free to
choose his own values, within bounds, which are not exceeded
here. They do serve however to support our conclusion as to
the kind of life Mark would be exposed to in the Painter house-
hold. We believe it would be unstable, unconventional, arty,
Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating.6
Finally, the court bluntly stated its conclusion: "We believe security and
stability in the home are more important than intellectual stimulation in
the proper development of a child." 67 The court ultimately left itself no
choice: if its concern is for the best interests of the child, and if it is not
prohibited from delving into every particular of the parents' and guar-
dians' lives, then when it sincerely believes that one home is "better"
than the other it must place the child in that home, and disregard the
natural parent's presumptive right.
The court was, of course, hesitant to merely characterize the Bannis-
ter home as better, and leave it at that. Rather, it put great weight on the
testimony of a psychologist, who felt that Mark identified Mr. Bannister
as his father figure, and that a change would be traumatic and detrimental
to him.68 While such testimony would have been a valid ground for
deciding the case, the lower court's rejection of the testimony and the
court's catalog of the shortcomings of the Painter home make it doubtful
that it was the real basis upon which the case was decided.
A recent Georgia case also dealt with a custody dispute in which
grandparents were vying with a natural parent for custody.69 Custody was
granted to the grandparents, who contended that the child was living in a
"commune-type environment which is immoral, unwholesome and dele-
terious to the welfare and well-being" of the child. This decision was
reached despite psychological testimony that the child was happy and
healthy, and over the objections of both natural parents .7 Dissenting,
Justice Gunter was appalled by the majority's disregard for the law that
''a natural parent has a paramount legal right to custody of his or her child
in a contest with a third party." 7 1 He argued that
65. Id. at-, 140 N.W.2d at 154-55.
66. Id. at-, 140 N.W.2d at 155-56.
67. Id. at-, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
68. Id. at-, 140 N.W.2d at 157-58. The lower court had not given as much weight to
the testimony because of the psychologist's unusual mannerisms, and because he taught at
the same university as Mr. Bannister. Id.
69. Bennett v. Clemens, 230 Ga. 317, 196 S.E.2d 842 (1973).
70. Id. at-, 196 S.E.2d at 843 (Gunter & Hawes, JJ., dissenting).
71. Id. at-, 196 S.E.2d at 844.
[w]hat a child is taught, with whom a child is allowed to as-
sociate, and the environment that a child is permitted to inhabit
-none of these individually and all of them in concert do not
[sic] constitute substantial justification for the state, through its
judiciary, to divest a natural parent of the permanent custody of
his child.
72
Pennsylvania courts have also exercised their discretion in judging
parents' lifestyles. Despite the well established principle that children
should not be removed from their mother's custody because she must
work for a living73 or because a higher standard of living can be provided
elsewhere, 74 the court in Commonwealth ex rel. Hubbell v. Hubbell
75
removed children from their mother for precisely these reasons. Mrs.
Hubbell worked in and lived above her second husband's taproom:
"[S]uch an arrangement impresses us as being decidedly unsatisfac-
tory." 76 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Wright challenged the basis of
the decision and its wisdom:
The reasoning of the lower court is based largely upon the
fact that the children must live in an apartment above a taproom
... . But this court certainly cannot say that a mother should
lose her children because she marries the proprietor of a tap-
room . . . . It is harmful to remove children summarily and
permanently from agreeable surroundings and associations inci-
dent to the only parental control and supervision they have ever
known.
77
In cases such as these, the courts are treading heavily upon constitutional-
ly protected ground. Children are taken from parents who have done
72. Id. at-, 196 S.E.2d at 845.
Where neglect, abuse, or mistreatment in some manner is absent, the state has no
right to inquire into what a parent teaches his child, or with whom a parent allows
his child to associate, or the type of environment a parent permits his child to
inhabit. These are fundamental family rights, protected by the Common Law and
our Bill of Rgiths, free from governmental intrusion. Freedom to think, teach, and
express; freedom of association with other persons or classes of persons with
varying degrees of morality and philosophy; freedom to inhabit a chosen cultural
environment; and freedom to adopt a life-style that may not have the approval of
the majority; all of these are basic to our concept of liberty, and these freedoms
exist even more emphatically within the family or the parent-child relationship.
Within this relationship the family or the parent adopts a moral standard for
the members' conduct and associations, and the state cannot intrude upon or
disrupt this relationship by asserting a different moral standard, conceived by
judges, that must be adhered to.
Id. at-, 196, S.E.2d at 844.
73. Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw, 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 344, 195 A.2d 878,
880 (1963); Commonwealth ex. rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 213, 166 A.2d
60, 62 (1960).
74. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 445, 292 A.2d
380, 384 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 216-17, 166
A.2d 60, 64 (1960).
75. 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 186, 107 A.2d 388 (1954).
76. Id. at 191, 107 A.2d at 391.
While the home is adequately furnished and contains the usual conveniences,
its intimate connection with the tavern is bound to expose the children to condi-
tions which cannot be otherwise than detrimental to their physical, intellectual,
moral and spiritual well-being. . . . It is simply a matter of common knowledge
that the presence of children in or around taprooms subjects them to influences
inimical to their moral and spiritual development.
Id.
77. Id. at 195-96, 107 A.2d at 393 (Wright, J., dissenting).
nothing more than exercise their right to choose a lifestyle and raise their
children free from judicial scrutiny.
C. Travel
Travel is yet another constitutional right of parents that has been
limited by courts deciding custody. For example, in cases involving a
parent who wishes to leave the state, courts have felt free to proscribe the
right to travel, or to deny custody entirely. "If all other factors are
approximately equal, the Courts should prefer a resident to a non-resident
guardian and custodian, since the former is more amenable to the court's
continuous watchful eye, supervision and control." 7 8 A parent's desire to
remove a child from the jurisdiction is not always a controlling factor,
7 9
but it is always one of the factors considered, and in some cases may
carry more weight than the court cares to admit. In Commonwealth ex rel.
Parikh v. Parikh ,80 for example, the dissent felt/that the only basis upon
which the majority overturned the tender years doctrine and awarded
custody to the father was "the reluctance to permit the child's departure
from the United States." 81 Such restrictions are a violation of a parent's
right to travel freely, with his own child, without judicial intervention.
D. Equal Protection for Poverty Parents: Neglect
In no custody dispute is the potential for judicial abuse more devas-
tating than in neglect proceedings against poor parents. The right of the
state under parens patriae to intrude into the family by way of neglect
proceedings has been linked with English "poor laws" that gave the state
the right to remove the children of the poor from their parents, and to
indenture them.8 2 Indeed, the first Pennsylvania case to use the phrase
parens patriae involved the removal of a young girl from the custody of
her parents and her placement in a house of refuge.83 The moral bent of
the court is clear:
The object of the charity is reformation, by training its inmates
to industry; by imbuing their minds with principles of morality
and religion; by furnishing them with means to earn a living;
and, above all, by separating them from the corrupting influence
of improper associates. 8
78. Shoemaker Appeal, 396 Pa. 378, 382, 152 A.2d 666, 669 (1959).
79. Davidyan v. Davidyan, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 495, 327 A.2d 139 (1974) (fact that
mother wanted to take the child to Scotland not controlling).
80. 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972).
81. Id. at 111, 296 A.2d at 629 (Eagen, J., joined by Roberts, & Pomeroy, JJ.,
dissenting).
82. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L REV.
205, 219 (1971). Parens patriae was transplanted from an "equitable concept applied by
chancellors between private parties. . . into a branch of the poor law where it was used to
justify the state statutory schemes to part poor or incompetent parents from their children."
Id. "Poor people were excluded from the idea that parents should be allowed to raise their
own children.'" Id. at 250.
83. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1829). See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
84. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
"The remedy was to inculcate conventional mores by parting the malle-
able children from their unregenerate parents and raising the children by
dominant standards."" 5 Statutes now codify the right of the state to
intrude-a right in conflict with parents' fundamental right to raise their
children, and a right exercised almost exclusively against the poor,
denying them equal protection.
At least two factors contribute to the disparate enforcement of
neglect laws. First, the judicial system in America is composed primarily
of white, middle-class males who bring with them to the bench their own
cultural child-rearing ideas, and their own class biases. 86 Second, when
the poor avail themselves of welfare or other social services, they subject
themselves to scrutiny by social workers, making them "peculiarly ac-
cessible to inquiry and surveillance. Thus, vulnerability to government
largesse and intrusion seem to be commensurate with one's class in
society.''
87
The issue of equal protection for the poor goes deeper even than the
middle-class judge's determination of an acceptable life-style; it reaches
the question of the court's ability to remove children from their parents
for the sole reason that the parents are poor.
88 In Ramos v. Montgomery89
a California District Court denied relief to welfare mothers requesting
child care payments equal to those received by foster homes. The court
conceded that the plaintiffs were "correct in stating that maintenance of
the family structure is a paramount purpose behind the federal program of
85. Rendleman, supra note 82, at 253. "You can exterminate any human class not
only by summary violence but by bringing up its children to be different." Id., quoting G.B.
Shaw.
86. See State Intrusion, supra note 19, at 1386-87:
[A]t the heart of most child welfare decisions is essentially a value judgment as to'what kind of a child one hopes to produce.' Substituting the state's decision for
the parent's often simply means accepting a judge's childrearing judgments over
those of the parents. Yet, the values of juvenile judges . . . are reflections of
their personal biases and-more importantly in a society whose judges are drawn
from the middle class while state intervention is often aimed against poor
families-of their class biases.
and KATZ, supra note 4, at 65:
[A]s broadness enhances discretion, it also provides the judge with the means for
making wide-ranging value judgments which may go unchecked . . . . [T~he
nonspecific statute[s] . . . and the cases which have been decided under them
sometimes appear to be a means of policing the poor, especially parents on public
welfare . . . . Here the interests of the child become secondary to the desire to
punish, thus subverting child protection, the basic philosophy behind the neglect
laws.
87. Levine, supra note 4, at 5.
88. One Assistant Public Defender assigned to represent parents in at least 90%
of the 5,022 dependency and neglect cases filed in Cook County, Illinois in 1971
has testified that while poverty was never alleged in the neglect petitions, it was
the underlying cause in the overwhelming majority of cases . . . . She further
indicated that most people charged were on AFDC or in the lowest economic
bracket, [and] that the conditions complained of would not have occurred had
their been sufficient funds ....
Thomas, Child Neglect Proceedings-A New Focus, 50 IND. L.J. 60, 61-62 (1974), quoting
Affidavit of Assistant Public Defender, Cook County, Ill., filed with complaint in Winston
v. Scott, Civil No. 72C- 1112 (N.D. Ill., filed May 5, 1972),
89. 313 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd mer., 400 U.S. 1003 (1971).
granting aid for the care of children. The family structure has been and
remains the cornerstone of our society." 9 But the court then rejected
plaintiffs' assertion by following this rousing defense of the family with
an extraordinary example of circular logic:
Some children must of necessity be placed in foster homes
due to the financial inability of the parents to provide a suitable
home. If such parents were to receive the same aid per child as
foster parents receive there is no doubt that they could do a
better job in supporting their children. Nevertheless, to give
them that additional aid . . . would result in an overall reduc-
tion in money available for foster home care.
9'
If the language of the court is to be taken at face value, it is indeed
possible to remove children from their parents simply because of their
poverty. While this may in fact be the case, 92 it is not the expressed
public policy of any state.
93
Pennsylvania courts have recognized that poverty alone may not be
the basis for a neglect proceeding. In Rinker Appeal9 4 the superior court
declared that
[t]he welfare of many children might be served by taking them
from their homes and placing them in what officials may con-
sider a better home. But the Juvenile Court Law was not in-
tended to provide a procedure to take the children of the poor
and give them to the rich . . . . 9
The court suggested that a neglect hearing was not a proper place for the
"best interests" doctrine. "The power of the Juvenile Court is not to
adjudicate what is for the best interests of a child, but to adjudicate
whether or not the child is neglected." 9 6 Unfortunately, the Rinker
dictum is not always recognized by the courts, and the potential danger of
the best interests doctrine is never greater than when it is used in order to
arrive at a decision in a neglect proceeding against poverty parents. In
such situations, placing the child in a "better home" to serve its "best
interests" involves virtually limitless judicial discretion and intervention,
and invites unchecked abuse.
90. Id. at 1181.
91. Id. at 1183 (emphasis added).
92. See note 88 supra.
93. Despite the court's observation that some children must 'of necessity' be
placed due to financial inability, the law of no state permits removal of a child
from its parents because of poverty alone; indeed, any statute purporting to allow
deprivation of parental custody on such grounds would be subject to severe
constitutional objection.
Thomas, supra note 88, at 61.
94. 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955).
95. Id. at 148, 117 A.2d at 783.
Under our system of government children are not the property of the state to
be reared only where and under such conditions as officials deem best. On the
other hand the state is interested in establishing a minimum standard of care for a
child's physical, intellectual and moral well-being. But this minimum standard
must be viewed in the light of experience. Although there are many very good
homes, there is no such thing as a 'perfect home.'
Id.
96. Id. at 148, 117 A.2d at 784.
IV. Reconciling the Rights of Parent and Child
The unlimited judicial inquiry into parents' personal lives that has
occurred in custody cases under the banner of the best interests doctrine
has led to a nightmarish situation in which parents' constitutional rights
are often violated and in which any custody decision reached by a court
can be justified. While this comment has focused upon abuse of the
parents' rights, it has been with a view to reconciling those rights with the
rights of the child. Certainly young children, victims of problems created
by or thrust upon their parents, merit the highest degree of concern and
protection that the courts can provide. The goal should be to formulate
guidelines that will shield a parent's life from the boundless scrutiny of
the court and, at the same time, allow the court to consider factors
relevant to the child's well-being and exercise sufficient discretion to
protect that well-being. Judicial guidelines must first provide a means to
determine the needs of the child; only then can "best interests" be
reoriented to serve the child rather than judge the parents.
A. The Need for Stability
1. Favoring the Parent or Guardian with Custody. -- [E]motional
attachments are tenuous and vulnerable in early life and need [the]
stability of external arrangements for their development." 97 Considering
this factor, many of the presumptions98 of custody cases that were meant
to foster the child's best interests actually work against them. For exam-
ple, the natural parent's presumptive right to custody grew from the idea
that parents were best able to care for their children, 99 and thus it was in
the child's best interests to be placed with its natural parent. While this
may often be true, it is certainly not the case when a child has spent its
formative years in a stable and loving environment with adults other than
its natural parents:
Nothing could be more cruel than the forceable [sic] separation
of a child from either its real or foster parents by whom it has
been lovingly cared for and to whom it is bound by strong ties
of affection; to a child it is equally cruel whether the separation
is brought about by 'kidnapping' or legal process.100
An example of such "kidnapping" by legal process is Common-
wealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw, 101 in which the court removed a five-year-
old girl from the custody of her paternal grandparents, with whom she
had lived since infancy, to return her to her mother. This result was
reached despite findings that the mother's home conditions were not as
favorable as the grandparents', that the child might encounter difficulty
97. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
34 (1973).
98. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
99. See note 2 supra.
100. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 97, 66 A.2d
300, 306 (1949).
101. 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 195 A.2d 878 (1963).
adjusting to them, and that the child did not respond well to her mother
and became quite disturbed when informed that she may have to leave her
grandparents.10 2 The court's decision was ostensibly justified by the
tender years doctrine and the presumptive right of a natural parent, but the
real basis for the decision seems to have been a desire to punish the
father, and thus his family, for having violated two previous court orders
demanding that the child be returned to the mother. Obviously the child's
best interests, which would have been served by her return to her natural
mother, were the furthest consideration from the court's mind. Shaw is
only one of many cases in which children were torn from happy and
stable environments, either to satisfy a particular custody maxim, or
because the court found something "unacceptable" about the custodial
parent(s) or guardian(s).'° 3
A guideline favoring continuing healthy relationships would restrain
the court's discretion in disrupting the delicate ties a child has formed. 104
Such a guideline would also free the court from its "responsibility" to
search out some flaw in the natural parent when the child has become
happily integrated in another home and the court wishes to allow the child
to remain there. The Painter v. Bannister'05 decision, for example,
would have been much easier-the child could have remained where it
had made a stable adjustment, and the father would not have been
subjected to an intense invasion of his privacy and judicial judgment of
his lifestyle.
2. Making Custody Decisions Permanent. -A second guideline in
protecting both the privacy of the parent or guardian and the development
of the child is that custody decisions should be permanent, subject to
reappraisal only under compelling circumstances.
Currently, "unlike other judgments or decrees, an order of child
custody is a unique and delicate matter. It is never final, but is considered
temporary in nature, subject to constant review and modification."
0 6
This temporary nature of custody orders not only threatens the formation
and uninterrupted continuation of relationships so crucial to children, but
also encourages abuse of judicial discretion by making the orders subject
to constant review and keeping parents or guardians under indefinite
judicial scrutiny. 107
102. Id. at 343-44, 195 A.2d at 880-81.
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Gardner v. Eastman, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 496, 94
A.2d 175 (1953)(eight-year-old boy taken from stepfather who had raised him; natural father
offered better "educational opportunities").
104. A trend in this direction is evidenced by some newly established rights of foster
parents. See Note, Increasing the Rights of Foster Parents, 36 U. PiTT. L. REV. 715 (1975).
105. See notes 62-68 and accompanying text supra.
106. Friedman v. Friedman, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 530, 534-35, 307 A.2d 292, 295 (1973).
See also Commonwealth ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 264 A.2d 420
(1970)(custody orders always temporary and subject to review to determine child's physical,
intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being).
107. For example, custody determinations following divorce are subject to re-
That the courts will be more willing to show restraint and respect for
the integrity of the existing family if custody decisions are permanent can
be seen by a quick look at involuntary termination proceedings. The
decisions in this area, where a child is freed for adoption over objection
from a natural parent, are of course permanent. At least partly for that
reason, courts have shown particular restraint. t °8 The rule that has
evolved regarding involuntary termination is that unless impressive evi-
dence of a natural parent's inadequacy is shown, the parent-child relation-
ship should not be disturbed.0 9 This rule incorporates the guidelines
regarding permanence and respect for existing relationships, and is ap-
plicable to all custody decisions if broadened to include guardians as well
as natural parents.
B. Restrictions on Admissible Evidence
The first two guidelines discussed focused on the child's needs, and
in so doing served at least tangentially to restrict judicial probing into the
lives of parents or guardians. The final proposed guideline seeks to set a
standard for admissible evidence to be employed along with the first two
guidelines: in determining whether or not a compelling reason exists to
remove a child from a stable environment, no evidence concerning a
parent or guardian's exercise of his or her constitutional rights, or vio-
lating his or her right to privacy, would be admissible absent a clear
showing that it was relevant to the child's well-being. A principle of this
type has received particular attention in child neglect cases11 ° and com-
evaluation at the ex-spouse's initiation. The parent who has custody must lead his or her life
under the watchful eye of the court, constantly fearing judicial intervention. See notes
38-41; and accompanying text, supra.
108. Seemn re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975)(retarded parent retained rights
where record did not show that the physical or mental well-being of the children suffered);
Jones Appeal, 449 Pa. 543, 297 A.2d 117 (1972) (mother who pleaded guilty to aiding in rape
of 14-year-old daughter retained rights where mother had promised to reunite with father
and the court found there was no continued abuse).
While involuntary termination is of course a very specific type of child custody
decision, the problems faced by the court are relevant to all custody proceedings, and
underscore the need for restraint:
In deciding whether a poor childrearing situation 'cannot. . .be remedied by the
parent,' the court must make a relative determination of the type of care neces-
sary for the well-being of the child. To pose an extreme example, is a child better
situated living with retarded natural parents who love him and provide for his
physical needs, or should he be freed for adoption by parents of normal intelli-
gence? Parental 'incapacity'... is a broad term, not susceptible of easy determi-
nation. Not only are societal views of productive adulthood disparate and varied,
but social scientists are in disagreement about how these goals are best acheived
through child-rearing. Thus, the terms 'incapacity' [and] 'neglect' . . . encom-
pass a myriad of value-laden judgments that must be made before a decree of
termination is entered.
48 TEMP. L.Q. 1050, 1060 (1975).
109. In re Adoption of Farabelli, 460 Pa. 423, 333 A.2d 846 (1975)
110. See, e.g., Rinker Appeal, 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955):
In a neglect case the question is not whether a parent is a law violator or uses
alcohol to excess, but whether intemperate and immoral conduct of the parent
creates such deficiencies in the parental care of the child as to require separating
him from his parent.
Id. at 154, 117 A.2d at 786.
mentaries: "To look at parental behavior except as it constitutes a danger
to the child is to grossly abuse the parens patriae power which should look
toward the salvation of the child, not the damnation of the parent."I11
This guideline is particularly important in divorce cases, since in a
battle for custody between two recently separated parents there is often an
existing relationship between the child and each of its parents, and both
parents may have an equal right and desire to have custody. Since neither
parent would have the advantage of an exclusive stable relationship, the
first guideline of favoring continuing relationships would be inapplicable.
In the absence of workable criteria for choosing between the parents, the
court will be especially tempted to delve into constitutionally protected
areas of each parent's life to determine which would better serve the
child's "best interests." Section 402 of the Revised Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act recognizes the irrelevance of evidence that does not
affect a parent or guardian's relationship to the child, and suggests some
areas that the court may properly consider:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the
best interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant
factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his
custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with
his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who
may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and com-
munity; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custo-
dian that does not affect his relationship to the child. 112
111. Sullivan, Child Neglect: The EnvironmentalAspects, 29 OHIO S.L.J. 85, 92 (1968).
See also State Intrusion, supra note 19, at 1388-89:
[T]he common usage of neglect proceedings to punish parents for such behaviors
as promiscuity and tavern hopping, absent any proof that their children are either
aware of or harmed by their conduct, represents a distortion of child welfare laws
to further society's collective interest in morality. Whatever may be the merits
and problems of prohibiting undesired sexual activities or drinking by adults, they
are distinct from those of child-welfare regulation. To advance indirectly a collec-
tive state goal such as morality by resort to child welfare regulation allows state
officials to infringe upon deeply personal and emotional attachments between
parent and child in order to punish parental conduct peripheral to the relationship.
(emphasis added).
112. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 172-73 (emphasis added). California has also codified
guidelines rather than allowing openended discretion:
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the court
may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time thereafter, make such
order for the custody of such child during his minority as may seem necessary or
proper. If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an
intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall consider and give due weight
to his wishes in making an award of custody or modification thereof. Custody
should be awarded in the following order of preference:
(a) To either parent according to the best interests of the child.
(b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been living in a
wholesome and stable environment.
While judicial discretion will still be involved in determining what
constitutes a "clear showing" that evidence invading a parent's rights is
relevant to the child's well-being, such a showing will at the very least
serve to remind the court that it is dealing in the highly sensitive area of a
parent's constitutional rights.
V. Conclusion
Three guidelines have been suggested as a basis for reaching deci-
sions in child custody cases: that preference be given to the parent or
guardian with whom the child already has an established bond and stable
environment; that custody decisions be made permanent so as to protect
the parent or guardian from indefinite scrutiny and to avoid disruption of
the child's development; and that no evidence relating to a parent or
guardian's exercise of a constitutional right or involving an invasion of
their privacy be admitted absent a clear showing that such evidence has a
direct bearing upon the welfare of the child.
The aim of these guidelines is to protect the privacy and constitu-
tional rights of the parents, and at the same time guard the welfare of the
child. A study of the present approach-unbridled judicial inquiry in the
name of "best interests"--shows that it disregards the rights of the
parents and does not often lead the court any closer to determining what
would in fact contribute to the child's best interests. Rather, the courts
become so involved in judging the parents that they feel free to totally
disrupt the child's life in order to punish "unacceptable" parental
behavior.
Limiting judicial inquiry would benefit both parent and child. Ulti-
mately, the courts "must take into account the law's incapacity to
supervise interpersonal relationships," 1 3 and recognize their own
limitations:
No one . . .can forecast just what experiences, what events,
what changes a child, or for that matter his adult custodian, will
actually encounter. Nor can anyone predict in detail how the
unfolding development of a child and his family will be re-
flected in the long run in the child's personality and character
formation. Thus the law will not act in the child's interests but
merely add to the uncertainties if it tries to do the impossible-
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable and able
to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons
other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that
an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to
a nonparent is required to serve the best interest of the child. Allegations that
parental custody would be detrimental to the child, other than a statement of that
ultimate fact, shall not appear in the pleadings. The court may, in its discretion,
exclude the public from the hearing on this issue.
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guess the future .... In the long run, the child's chances will
be better if the law is less pretentious and ambitious in its aim,
[and] if it confines itself to the avoidance of harm .... 114
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